Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

2012

Judicial Selection Reconsidered: A Plea for Radical Moderation
Charles G. Geyh
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, cgeyh@indiana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Judges Commons

Recommended Citation
Geyh, Charles G., "Judicial Selection Reconsidered: A Plea for Radical Moderation" (2012). Articles by
Maurer Faculty. 829.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/829

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

JUDICIAL SELECTION RECONSIDERED: A PLEA FOR
RADICAL MODERATION
CHARLES GARDNER GEYH*

I.

RETHINKING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
FOR COURTS INFLUENCED BY LAW
AND POLITICS ........................................................625
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RETHINKING
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE FOR
JUDICIAL SELECTION .............................................629
III. ISOLATING CORE INDEPENDENCE PROBLEMS
AND MARGINALIZING DISTRACTIONS .................631
A. The Re‐Selection Problem ............................634
B. The Campaign Finance Problem .................636
C. The Precommitment Problem......................636
IV. LOOKING FORWARD ..............................................638
A. Re‐Selection Reform......................................639
B. Campaign Finance Reform ..........................640
C. Precommitment Reform ...............................641
CONCLUSION ................................................................642

The judicial selection debate features a formidable list of
seemingly unrelated issues that obscures the pivotal disagree‐
ment at the core of the dispute.1 Proponents of contested elec‐
* Associate Dean of Research and John F. Kimberling Professor of Law, Indiana
University Maurer School of Law. I would like to thank Cristina Costa, Mike
Metcalf, and Kelsey Shea for their research assistance
1. Such issues include: Which system selects judges who are more credentialed,
more experienced, more diverse, or less likely to be disciplined? Are voters com‐
petent, informed, and interested enough to cast meaningful ballots in judicial
races? Do impending elections affect the decisions judges make, and, if so, is that
a good thing? Is it helpful, hurtful, or impossible to take partisanship out of the
equation through nonpartisan elections? Do “merit‐selection” systems make
choices based on merit or politics? Do retention elections serve their purpose, or
fail either because they do not engage voters or because incumbents are defense‐
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tions ultimately proceed from a simple premise: Judges, like
legislators, are policymakers who, in a representative democ‐
racy, should be accountable to the people they serve.2 Within
this camp, some make the point with irritation: Judges should
exercise restraint and avoid policymaking but often do not.3
Others are untroubled by judicial policymaking, which they
regard as inevitable.4 Either way, the argument against an ap‐
pointed judiciary and for an elected one follows naturally and
can be expressed as a syllogism: Unelected judges are unac‐
countable policymakers; unaccountable policymakers flout the
rule of law and the will of the people; therefore, unelected
judges flout the rule of law and the will of the people. Conclu‐
sion: Judges should be elected.
Proponents of appointed judiciaries proceed similarly, but
from an opposing premise: Judges uphold the rule of law and,
therefore, they need to be independent of those—including vot‐
ers—who would interfere with their impartial judgment.5
Judges are thus fundamentally different from policymakers in
less against stealth opposition campaigns? Are judges influenced by their cam‐
paign supporters or opponents, and, if so, can (or should) campaign finance re‐
form diminish that influence? Is the public’s confidence in the judiciary damaged
by fractious partisan appointment battles, contentious election campaigns, the
perceived influence of campaign support, and public statements of judicial aspi‐
rants who precommit themselves to deciding future cases from the campaign
stump or in appointment proceedings? And to what extent do answers to any of
these questions vary depending on whether we are discussing supreme courts,
intermediate appellate courts, or trial courts?
2. See, e.g., CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2 (2009); Julius Uehlein & David H. Wilderman, Opinion: Why
Merit Selection Is Inconsistent with Democracy, 106 DICK. L. REV. 769, 769, 772 (2002);
Dennis B. Wilson, Electing Federal Judges and Justices: Should the Supra‐Legislators Be
Accountable to the Voters?, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 695, 732 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Craig Huey, JUDGE VOTER GUIDE, http://www.judgevoterguide.com/
(last visited Feb. 1, 2012) (recommending certain judicial candidates in an effort to
help prevent voters from electing judicial activists); Tom Parker, Elect Judges So
They Can Be Held Accountable, THE IOWA REPUBLICAN (Aug. 20, 2010)
http://theiowarepublican.com/2010/elect‐judges‐so‐they‐can‐be‐held‐accountable/
(Alabama Supreme Court Justice Tom Parker advocating for judicial elections as a
solution to stop judicial activists); Bruce Walker, Should We Elect Judges?, AM.
THINKER
(May
23,
2011),
http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/05/
should_we_elect_judges.html (advocating a constitutional amendment requiring
the election of federal judges and justices as a solution to judicial activism).
4. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Judges and Politics: What to Do and Not Do About
Some Inevitable Problems, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 283 (2007).
5. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 70–71 (2003); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial
Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 49 (2003).
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the “political branches” of government: They do not make
rules of law but impartially apply rules made by the other
branches. From there, the argument against an elected judiciary
and for an appointed one is reducible to a competing syllo‐
gism: Judges must be independent of the electorate to uphold
the rule of law and fulfill their constitutional role; elected
judges are not independent of the electorate; therefore, elected
judges do not uphold the rule of law and fulfill their constitu‐
tional role. Conclusion: Judges should be appointed.
In this Essay, I argue that it is no longer credible to contend
that judges simply declare what the law is without regard to
what they think the law should be. In difficult cases, judicial deci‐
sionmaking requires discretion that inevitably brings legal and
extralegal considerations to bear. Conceding that judges are
“policymakers” in some sense of the term, however, does not
mean that judges are undeserving of independence denied pub‐
lic officials in the political branches. What judges do is different
from what other public officials do in ways that justify a meas‐
ure of autonomy for a quasi‐legal, quasi‐political judiciary. The
net effect of these differences is to make the judge a unique kind
of occasional policymaker, who does not represent a constitu‐
ency in the same way as elected officials in the other branches.
Whether those differences warrant independence from the
electorate in periodic elections is context‐dependent, which
helps explain why debate over the optimal system of judicial
selection is inevitable, perpetual, and, in the minds of some,
hopeless. Thinking about judicial selection with reference to the
justifications for judicial independence developed here enables
us to get past unproductive, all‐or‐nothing arguments about
whether judges should be elected or appointed and instead iso‐
late three core threats to independence so as to focus the de‐
bate: judicial re‐selection, real or perceived dependence on
campaign supporters, and candidate precommitments. I con‐
clude with some thoughts on how to remedy these problems
incrementally, without resorting to all‐or‐nothing arguments.
I.

RETHINKING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE FOR COURTS
INFLUENCED BY LAW AND POLITICS

I have argued elsewhere that the legal establishment has
painted itself into a corner by defending the need for judicial
independence with almost exclusive reference to an implausi‐
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ble claim—reminiscent of rigid nineteenth‐century formal‐
ism—that independent judges do not make rules of law but
merely follow them.6 The public likes to hear judges say that
they are like umpires with discretion constrained by rules akin
to a strike zone,7 and so judges oblige.8 Even though the public
might be heartened by judges who profess allegiance to the
rule of law, survey data reveal that the public believes what
social science research confirms: Judicial decisionmaking in‐
volves an exercise of discretion subject to legal and extralegal
influences, including ideology.9 Thus, when the legal estab‐
lishment argues that judges should be insulated from external
controls because such controls will contort the rule of law that
independent judges are singlemindedly committed to uphold‐
ing, it forces the judiciary to defend its independence with
counterfactual claims that the public does not accept.
It is thus unsurprising that most people favor judicial elec‐
tions,10 presumably as a way to guard against judges running
amok. There are three more plausible justifications for judicial
independence that are not grounded in the somewhat other‐
worldly premise that independent judges make rulings of law
unsullied by extralegal influences.
First, independent judges are better situated to respect the
dictates of due process. The Fourteenth Amendment demands
that judicial rulings be produced in a fundamentally fair proc‐
ess that includes notice and an opportunity to be heard before
6. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
7. Umpires themselves liken the strike zone to the Constitution. BRUCE WEBER,
AS THEY SEE ‘EM: A FAN’S TRAVELS IN THE LAND OF UMPIRES 172 (2009) (“‘It’s like
the Constitution,’ [one umpire] said to me. ‘The strike zone is a living, breathing
document.’”).
8. John Roberts’s confirmation proceedings provide an apt example of this phe‐
nomenon. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 31 (2005) (statement of Jeff Sessions, Senator from Alabama).
9. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Inde‐
pendence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH 9, 24 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002); Gregory C.
Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statis‐
tical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 779–83 (2005); AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 5, at
17–18 (describing public attitudes toward the judiciary).
10. Debra Cassens Weiss, 55% of Potential Voters Support Judicial Elections for State
Judges, ABAJOURNAL (Oct. 21, 2008 11:08 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/55_of_potential_voters_support_judicial_elections.
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an impartial judge.11 Tom Tyler and others have found that if
litigants perceive the process as fair, they will more readily ac‐
cept adverse outcomes in judicial proceedings.12 Further, liti‐
gants will be more likely to perceive the process as fair if their
proceeding includes an independent judge who is not subject
to the control of outside forces that could contort the judicial
process to achieve particular results.13 That remains true irre‐
spective of whether the independent judge’s ruling involves an
exercise of discretion influenced by what she regards as sound
legal or public policy.14
Second, independent judges are better situated to administer
justice on a case‐by‐case basis. Richard Posner and others have
argued that most judges are pragmatists,15 meaning that they
seek the best results in a given case, informed by applicable
law, facts, and policy.16 Seeking justice in this commonsense
way requires a familiarity with, and sensitivity to, case‐specific
information that presiding judges possess and interested out‐
siders lack. This information asymmetry between judges and
interested outsiders justifies judicial independence from such
outsiders to the extent necessary for judges to administer
pragmatic justice—even though the pragmatic choices judges
make can implicate a kind of judicial policymaking.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI, XIV, § 1; see also In re Stuhl, 233 S.E.2d 562, 568
(N.C. 1977) (“A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a
proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as
authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications
concerning a pending or impending proceeding.ʺ); JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL.,
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 2–23 (4th ed. 2007) (“Litigants have a right to ex‐
pect . . . that the case will be heard in a public forum before an impartial judge or
jury with representatives of both sides present.”); RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 31 (2d ed. 2007)
(“[B]oth the United States Constitution and those of the various states, guarantee
that litigants will receive ‘due process of law’, which entitles a person to an impar‐
tial tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.”).
12. Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the
Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 117 (1988).
13. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Independence as a Governing Mechanism, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at 56, 69 (“[T]he over‐
riding concern [in adjudications between private parties or between a private
party and the government] is that the matter be decided fairly, which means that
the court must apply established legal rules to the dispute.”).
14. See id. at 69–70.
15. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 230 (2008).
16. See Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS
L.J. 1, 137–38 (1998).
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Third, independent judges remain better able to uphold the
law. Even though scholars are preoccupied with hotly con‐
tested issues in the small percentage of cases decided by courts
of last resort, in the vast majority of cases the applicable law is
relatively easy to parse. In such cases, the role of judicial poli‐
cymaking is greatly circumscribed. Accordingly, the accompa‐
nying need for judges to be independent from external sources
of interference that could contort otherwise clear applications
of the law is more obvious.17 Even in difficult cases, questions
of law do not cease to be questions of law merely because they
cannot be answered with mathematical precision or because
liberals and conservatives think differently about the answers.
Although judges’ policy preferences might influence their legal
reasoning, judges generally appear to be sincere when they say
they are following the law as they understand it to be written.18
In this context, independence enables judges to give their best
assessment of what the law is. We can concede that judges are
influenced by their policy preferences and are thus “policy‐
makers” in some sense of the term and still conclude that
judges are a special kind of policymaker. They are special in
that they are trained in law (in state systems, judges—unlike
officeholders in the political branches—must be lawyers19),
they are acculturated to the legal process from law school and
years of practice, and they make decisions bounded by law as
they understand it, even if that understanding is subject to
ideological influence. Insulating judges from the influence of
outsiders, who are unversed in law and indifferent to the law
as long as they obtain preferred outcomes, thus promotes the
rule of law, broadly defined.
In short, judges and legislators make policy in different
ways.20 When judges make policy‐laden choices, they do so in
17. See POSNER, supra note 15, at 45–46.
18. See, e.g., EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS, & PERCEPTION: HOW POLICY
PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING 23–25 (2009); C. K. ROWLAND &
ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 147–48
(1996).
19. Geyh, supra note 5, at 59 & n.71 (2003).
20. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2011) (acknowl‐
edging the differences between legislative voting and judicial rulings); see also id.
at 2353 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing how the differing roles if the legisla‐
tive, executive, and judicial bodies “may call for a different understanding of the
responsibilities attendant upon holders of those respective offices and of the le‐
gitimate restrictions that may be imposed upon them”).
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the process of administering justice in cases where they have
access to dispute‐specific details the public lacks, their choices
are constrained by applicable law, and they have an under‐
standing of the relationship of the rights of parties relative to
the public at large. Unlike legislators, judges do not represent
the voting public as a single, clearly defined constituency.
Rather, judges must be mindful of multiple and sometimes
conflicting constituencies, which renders the term unhelpful
and misleading when applied to judges. Those “constituents”
include the people who appear before the judge as parties and
whose rights are at stake, the people who ordained and estab‐
lished the constitutions judges uphold, the people who elect
the legislators who write laws judges interpret, the people who
are subject to laws judges interpret, and, in jurisdictions with
elected judiciaries, the people who vote the judge into office.
Moreover, unlike legislators, who are rightly partial to public
preferences, judges swear to be impartial and are under an ethi‐
cal duty to disregard “public clamor.”21
II.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF RETHINKING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
FOR JUDICIAL SELECTION

Thinking about judicial selection as a way to manage the in‐
dependence and accountability of judges as a unique species of
decisionmaker influenced by law and policy (among other fac‐
tors) moves the debate away from the extremes. Categorical
claims that judges should be insulated from electoral account‐
ability because independent judges uphold the law understate
the role of judges as policymakers. When it comes to the com‐
mon law (which implicates the judicial campaign pot‐boiler:
tort liability and reform), the role of judge as policymaker is
indisputable, and in close questions of constitutional interpre‐
tation social science data offer compelling evidence that judges
on courts of last resort are influenced by their policy predilec‐
tions.22 Conversely, categorical claims that judges should be
subject to electoral accountability because they are no different
21. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.4(A) (2007) (“A judge shall
not be swayed by public clamor . . . .”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006) (requiring
judges to take oath to “faithfully and impartially discharge and perform” the du‐
ties of office).
22. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 17, 62–63 (1993).
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from elected policymakers in the political branches are over‐
stated. Judges are different. Though judges forge public policy,
they do so in a unique context where law continues to operate
as a decision‐making constraint (even if it is a less robust con‐
straint than the legal establishment contends), and judges op‐
erate pursuant to a process where a measure of detachment
from external sources of influence is necessary and desirable.
Between these extremes, the operative question becomes
whether the need for popular constraints on judicial policy‐
making trumps the need for judicial independence from popu‐
lar interference with judicial decisionmaking. The answer logi‐
cally turns on which selection option under consideration
optimizes “good” independence that enables judges to follow
due process, administer pragmatic justice, and uphold the rule
of law, while minimizing “bad” independence that liberates
judges to disregard these same three objectives. How selection
options are viewed is context‐dependent: The extent of the per‐
ceived need for popular constraints on judicial policymaking in
a given jurisdiction will vary depending on that jurisdiction’s
history, political traditions, and current political culture; the
nature and extent of the particular judiciary’s policymaking
role; recent events fueling public suspicions of an unaccount‐
able judiciary run amok or an honorable judiciary under siege;
and which tier of court is under scrutiny. Three consequences
follow: First, variations in selection systems among states are
unavoidable and perhaps desirable, as different states assess
their relative need for independence and accountability in dif‐
ferent ways. Second, a state’s selection system is subject to
change over time as circumstances affecting the independence‐
accountability balance change. Third, in states where systems
of selection are entrenched, incremental measures may be the
only viable means of reform.
The last point bears particular emphasis: With exceptions,
sweeping changes in selection systems—from appointive systems
to partisan elections in the mid‐nineteenth century, to nonpartisan
elections at the turn of the twentieth century, to merit selection in
the mid‐twentieth century—have come in movements of rela‐
tively short duration.23 When, as now, the latest movement has
run its course and the political will for fundamental change is ab‐
23. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It
Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1261–62 (2008).
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sent, incremental reform can be the most practical means to lessen
some of the baleful effects of independence‐threatening account‐
ability or accountability‐threatening independence.24
III.

ISOLATING CORE INDEPENDENCE PROBLEMS AND
MARGINALIZING DISTRACTIONS

In short, it makes sense to think about judicial selection gen‐
erally, and judicial elections in particular, in terms of promot‐
ing and constraining the independence of judges who are sub‐
ject to legal and extralegal influences, to further the objectives
of protecting due process, administering pragmatic justice, and
upholding the rule of law. Doing so makes it easier to isolate
problems and marginalize distractions. Three recent election
experiences offer a useful context for such analysis: partisan
elections in West Virginia, nonpartisan elections in Wisconsin,
and retention elections in the merit selection state of Iowa.
In a 2004 partisan election campaign in West Virginia that
pitted incumbent Justice Warren McGraw against challenger
Brent Benjamin, Massey Coal Company CEO Don Blankenship,
whose company was then a defendant poised to appeal a $50‐
million judgment against it, launched a $3‐million independent
campaign to defeat McGraw.25 Although Blankenship candidly
explained that McGraw “votes almost every time for plaintiffs
and against job providers,” the principle thrust of the advertis‐
ing campaign he underwrote accused McGraw of being “soft
on crime” because of a vote he cast in a sex offender case.26
Plaintiffs’ lawyers formed an organization of their own that
spent $1 million attacking Benjamin as a puppet of big business
because of Blankenship’s support.27 Benjamin won the election,
refused to recuse himself from the Massey case on the basis
that he was not actually biased and that appearances should
not guide disqualification determinations, and cast the decid‐

24. Cf. James Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60
SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 302 (2010).
25. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009).
26. Toby Coleman, Massey CEO gives $1.7 Million to anti‐Warren McGraw group,
W. VA. CITIZEN ACTION GROUP (Oct. 15, 2004), http://www.wvcag.org/news/
fair_use/2004/10_15a.htm.
27. See id.
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ing vote in favor of Massey and Blankenship.28 Meanwhile,
West Virginia Chief Justice Spike Maynard was photographed
vacationing with Blankenship, while Associate Justice Larry
Starcher publicly referred to Blankenship as “a clown.”29 May‐
nard and Starcher recused themselves from rehearing the
Massey appeal, but Benjamin did not and again cast the court’s
deciding vote for Massey30—only to have the decision reversed
by the Supreme Court in 2009 on due process grounds.31
After a brief period of calm, another West Virginia Supreme
Court justice was in the news. As a candidate in 2008, Menis
Ketchum was asked about an act limiting tort liability for
medical professionals. Ketchum declared, “I will not vote to
overturn it. I will not vote to change it. I will not vote to modify
it.”32 Ketchum was elected and later declined to disqualify him‐
self from the case in which the constitutionality of the act was
at issue, explaining that his “predisposition [did] not equate to
an actual bias.”33 The next week, Ketchum reversed course and
recused himself. He accused the lawyers who sought his dis‐
qualification of “attempting to create a ‘firestorm,’” and ex‐
plained that he did not “want our Court to be publicly ma‐
ligned,” but added that his campaign statements were
protected by the First Amendment, and that he “strongly be‐
lieve[d] that there [was] absolutely no legal basis for [his] dis‐
qualification.”34
In 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a
statutory ban on same‐sex marriage violated the Iowa Consti‐
tution.35 The next year, three members of the court’s seven jus‐
tices stood for retention election and were defeated following a
28. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 292–93 (W. Va. 2008)
(Benjamin, C.J., concurring).
29. Chris Dickerson, Attorney had prior notice of Monaco photos, W. VA. RECORD,
May 8, 2008, http://www.wvrecord.com/news/212130‐attorney‐had‐prior‐notice‐
of‐monaco‐photos.
30. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258.
31. See id. at 2265–67.
32. Jessica M. Karmasek, Ketchum refuses to recuse himself from case, W.VA.
RECORD, Sept. 27, 2010, http://www.wvrecord.com/news/229987‐ketchum‐refuses‐
to‐recuse‐himself‐from‐case.
33. See id.
34. Jessica M. Karmasek, Ketchum reverses course, recuses himself, W. VA. RECORD,
Sept. 28, 2010, http://www.wvrecord.com/news/230005‐ketchum‐reverses‐course‐
recuses‐himself.
35. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009).
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campaign in which opponents of gay marriage spent more than
$1 million and the incumbents raised no money at all but were
defended by a group of lawyers and former public officials.36
Meanwhile, attorney James Bopp filed suit challenging the con‐
stitutionality of Iowa’s merit selection system, arguing that the
disproportionate representation of lawyers on the state’s nomi‐
nating commission violated the equal protection principle of
“one person one vote.”37
In Wisconsin’s February 2011 nonpartisan primary election,
Justice David Prosser and challenger JoAnne Kloppenburg
were chosen to face each other in the general election, with
Prosser receiving 55% of the primary vote to Kloppenburg’s
25%.38 That same month Wisconsin Republican Governor Scott
Walker proposed a budget repair bill that drew fire from public
employees’ unions and morphed the supreme court election
into a referendum on the governor’s program given the antici‐
pated legal challenges to the bill.39 Neither candidate took a po‐
sition on the budget bill, but during the previous December
Prosser’s campaign manager stated that Prosser would offer a
“common‐sense complement” to the Walker administration—a
statement Prosser later disavowed.40 An anti‐Prosser campaign
claimed that “Prosser = Walker,” given his decisions across a
series of cases.41 Associate Justice Michael Gableman endorsed
Prosser and accused Kloppenburg of “hitch[ing] her wagon to
the partisan star by deliberately fostering the idea that she will
work against everything that Scott Walker proposes . . . .”42 In
the midst of the campaign, the press reported that the previous
36. David Pitt & Michael J. Crumb, 3 Iowa justices ousted, rulings likely slowed,
WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/
article/2010/11/03/AR2010110300948.html.
37. Rachel Caufield, Keeping Courts Free from Political Pressure, AM. JUDICATURE
SOC’Y (Jan. 2011), http://www.ajs.org/ajs/publications/judicatories/2011/jan/
feature_iacourts.asp; see also Nelson Lund, May Lawyers be Given the Power to Elect
Those who Choose Our Judges? “Merit Selection” and Constitutional Law, 34 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 1043 (2011).
38. Monica Davey, Wisconsin Election Is Referendum on Governor, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2011, at A13.
39. See id.
40. Tom Kertscher, Greater Wisconsin Committee says state Supreme Court Justice
David Prosser equals Gov. Scott Walker, POLITIFACT WIS. (March 31, 2011, 9:00 AM),
http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2011/mar/31/greater‐wisconsin‐
committee/greater‐wisconsin‐committee‐says‐state‐supreme‐cou/.
41. Id.
42. Davey, supra note 38.
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year Prosser had screamed at the Chief Justice, “calling her a
‘bitch’ and threatening to ‘destroy’ her,” leading Prosser to ac‐
knowledge, “I probably overreacted, but I think it was entirely
warranted . . . .”43 Nearly 1.5 million ballots were cast at the
conclusion of a $5.4‐million campaign, in which independent
organizations spent $4.5 million ($2.7 million on behalf of
Prosser, and $1.8 million on behalf of Kloppenburg).44 Election
night results showed that Kloppenburg had won by 200 votes,
but the next day a county clerk announced that she had discov‐
ered 14,000 uncounted ballots and Prosser was declared the
winner by more than 7000 votes.45
Analyzing these events with reference to the tripartite justifi‐
cation for judicial independence and accountability makes it
possible to isolate three recurring problems.
A.

The Re‐Selection Problem

Justice McGraw’s defeat in West Virginia was partially attrib‐
utable to a vote he cast as a sitting judge in a criminal case.46 The
three Iowa justices lost because of their votes in the same‐sex
marriage case.47 If we accept the proposition that judges must be
independent enough to respect the due process rights of parties,
administer justice in situation‐specific contexts, and apply the
law as they understand it to be written, then putting judges at
risk of losing their jobs for making a choice in an isolated case
summarized for voters in advertising campaigns is troublesome.
The Wisconsin campaign stood on slightly different footing.
There, the core concern related to Prosser’s likely vote in a future
case given his ideological alignment with the governor, as re‐
vealed by his voting record as a judge and as a former Republican
Speaker of the state House.48 Similarly, in West Virginia,
43. Patrick Marley, Supreme Court tensions boil over, JSONLINE, Mar. 19, 2011,
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/118310479.html.
44. Patrick Marley, Spending on high court race topped $5 million, JSONLINE, Apr. 19,
2011, http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/120207389.html?page=5&viewAll=1; Pat‐
rick Marley et. al., State Supreme Court race headed for likely recount, JSONLINE, Apr. 6,
2011, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/119308059.html.
45. Todd Richmond, Recount ends, gives Prosser the win in Supreme Court race,
WIS. ST. J., May 21, 2011, http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt‐and‐
politics/elections/article_344fd65e‐8337‐11e0‐93c3‐001cc4c002e0.html?mode=story.
46. See Coleman, supra note 26.
47. See Pitt & Crumb, supra note 36.
48. See Kertscher, supra note 40.
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McGraw’s allegedly pro‐plaintiff bias went more to his general
ideological leanings across cases than his vote in a specific case.49
Thus, although each of these judges was attacked for his de‐
cisions as a judge, the point was to attack each judge for his
general ideological orientation rather than for his previous vote
in a given case. Even though such a strategy arguably im‐
pinged on the judge’s independence by punishing him for con‐
struing the law as he conceived it to be written, it likewise ar‐
guably targeted a judge who needed to be held accountable for
his judicial philosophy across a body of work.
Some have rejoined that in Iowa, too, the retention elections
merely curbed bad independence with electoral accountabil‐
ity,50 but the argument is less persuasive. First, one ruling in a
multi‐year term is weak evidence of a “justice gone rogue.”
Second, the gay marriage case was decided by a unanimous
court comprised of justices appointed by governors from both
political parties,51 undercutting arguments that it was an ideo‐
logically motivated usurpation of power. Third, post‐election
focus groups confirmed the intuitive suspicion that many vot‐
ers were animated by their aversion to gay marriage, not by
their assessment of the justices’ constitutional analysis.52
49. See Coleman, supra note 26.
50. See A.G. Sulzberger, In Iowa, Voters Oust Judges Over Marriage Issue, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/politics/03judges.html (“The
close vote concluded an unusually aggressive ouster campaign in the typically sleepy
state judicial retention elections that pitted concerns about judicial overreaching
against concerns about judicial independence. After years of grumbling about
‘robed masters,’ conservatives demonstrated their ability to target and remove
judges who issue opinions they disagree with.”); see also Mike Malloy, On the No‐
vember ballot: Judicial retention, AMES NEWS ONLINE (Sept. 30, 2010, 3:30 PM),
http://amesnewsonline.com/category/news/government/november‐ballot‐judicial‐
retention (“[Through retention elections,] many groups are working to change the
court’s lineup. ‘Judges have gone way past their bounds,’ said Ryan Rhodes, chair of
the Iowa Tea Party Patriots and former state legislature candidate in Ames. ‘It’s not
based on one decision it’s the over‐arching idea of how they handle their job as jus‐
tices, believing that they get to make law.’”).
51. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, Iowa Justice System: Detailed In‐
formation, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.org/states/data/iowa‐justice‐system‐
detailed‐information (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (showing that Chief Justice Ternus
and Justice Cady were appointed by Gov. Terry Branstad, a Republican, and Jus‐
tices Striet, Wiggins, Hect, and Appel were appointed by Gov. Tom Vilsack, a
Democrat.).
52. Roy A. Schotland, Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Election: Appropriate Accountability or
Rampant Passion?, 46 CT. REV. 118, 123 (2011) (“[P]ost‐election gatherings in Iowa
have looked back on the election usefully. In December, two focus groups met to
discuss the election. According to one observer’s report: We heard a lot of ‘It may
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The Campaign Finance Problem

The financial support Justice Benjamin received from
Blankenship created a widespread suspicion that it would in‐
fluence his judgment in Caperton—a suspicion heightened by
Benjamin’s vote.53 With legislators, one might worry about
campaign supporters buying access or otherwise exerting dis‐
proportionate influence on officeholders, but there is nothing
inherently problematic about the basic notion that legislators
listen to, and are influenced by, members of the public who
support them. With judges, however, that basic notion is
anathema: Due process seeks to minimize such influences by
guaranteeing an impartial adjudicator and excluding public
opinion from evidence admissible in judicial proceedings, and
the rule of law interposes legal text between the choices judges
make and public preferences.
C.

The Precommitment Problem

Justice Ketchum committed himself to decide a future tort re‐
form case in a specified way.54 There is a difference between a
judge who makes clear his general orientation on questions of
legal policy and judicial philosophy through a public an‐
nouncement of his views and the judge who promises voters
that he will rule a particular way in a future case—even though
that difference can be blurred at the margins. It is the difference
between honestly acknowledging the relevance of ideological
predilections in judicial decisionmaking, and entitling judicial
candidates to let those predilections enslave them.
Legislators who promise to take specified action if elected
create an interdependent relationship with voters that epito‐
have been the ‘right’ decision based on the Constitution, but I just don’t like it. So
I voted them out.’”).
53. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Case May Define When a Judge Must Recuse Self, WASH.
POST, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2009/
03/01/AR2009030102265_3.html (“Caperton has drawn lopsided support in the case
from legal and business groups, as well as those who worry about the role money now
plays in judicial elections. Wal‐Mart joined with Lockheed Martin, Pepsi and other
corporations on Caperton’s side, telling the court in a brief that requiring Benjaminʹs
recusal ‘would signal to businesses and the general public that judicial decisions can‐
not be bought and sold.’”); Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court case with the feel of a best seller,
USATODAY.COM, Feb. 16, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009‐02‐
16‐grisham‐court_N.htm (“More than 40 groups, including the American Bar Associa‐
tion, have weighed in with 11 ‘friend of the court’ briefs supporting Caperton.”).
54. See Karmasek, supra note 32, and accompanying text.
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mizes representative democracy in action. With judicial candi‐
dates, however, the electorate—or whoever selects them in ap‐
pointive systems—is not their constituency in the same sense.
Rather, judicial precommitments amount to an Alice in Wonder‐
land embrace of “sentence first, verdict afterwards” in which
the judge promises to reach a result in exchange for his selec‐
tion, without regard to the principle that judicial decisions
must be based on information constrained by due process and
applicable law, or the principle that decisions must be tailored
to administer justice in the context of specific cases, the facts of
which are adduced in litigation.
The Wisconsin experience is distinguishable: Although a
critical issue concerned how the candidates would rule in a fu‐
ture case, the answer turned on their ideological predilections,
not precommitments. To say that Prosser’s views “comple‐
ment” the governor’s elucidates his leanings without binding
him to specific outcomes. The tactic remains problematic in
that it constrains the judge’s independence by complicating his
ability to follow the law and rule against the governor without
looking duplicitous (which may be why Prosser distanced him‐
self from the statement), but it is arguably oriented more to‐
ward constraining bad independence than good, by holding
judges prospectively accountable to the electorate for their ex‐
tralegal preferences.
Apart from these three core issues, there are distractions. In
Iowa (and other states where Bopp has filed claims), the argu‐
ment that lawyers must not be overrepresented on merit selec‐
tion commissions relative to the general population55 proceeds
from the wrong‐headed premise that judges “represent” citi‐
zens as legislators do. Once we acknowledge the unique role
that judicial decisionmakers play, the special relevance of legal
expertise in assessing judicial (as compared to legislative) merit
becomes obvious. There are excellent reasons to increase non‐
lawyer membership on nominating commissions—it increases
public participation in judicial selection, empowers the public
to hold judges prospectively accountable, and might enhance
public confidence in judges so selected—but spurious claims
that the Constitution requires states to regulate the selection of
judges as if they were legislators is not one of them.
55. See supra note 37, and accompanying text.
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Another distraction is the generalized concern that judicial
elections are nasty or politicized. In a post‐realist age, the ideo‐
logical orientation of judicial aspirants matters. Quarrels over
ideological predilection have become routine in state appellate
races and federal judicial appointments, and it might be only a
matter of time before they become more common on nominat‐
ing commissions in merit selection states. As much as the legal
establishment might prefer that judicial selection be an apoliti‐
cal, low‐key affair, the times are changing—and not inevitably
for the worse. In Wisconsin, for example, some were appalled
by the acrimonious campaign that degenerated to leaking
memos about court infighting,56 but ironically, the issue of Jus‐
tice Prosser’s temperament, civility, and collegiality probably
had greater bearing on his fitness to serve than his likely vote
in an isolated public employee union case.
IV.

LOOKING FORWARD

Ending judicial elections would arguably lessen the three
core problems discussed above. Without elections, re‐selection
becomes irrelevant (unless one adopts a Virginia or South
Carolina model, with legislative reappointment57), there are no
campaigns to finance, and campaign promises become unnec‐
essary. However, each of these claims is overstated. The pri‐
mary alternative to contested elections is merit selection, and
there is no political will to adopt merit selection without reten‐
tion elections—a form of re‐selection that brought us the Iowa
debacle. Although campaign finance problems are of greatest
concern in contested elections, the million‐dollar campaign in
the recent Iowa retention elections and the formidable sums
spent by interest groups in U.S. Supreme Court confirmation
proceedings broaden that concern. And candidates in contested
elections are not the only judicial aspirants who might feel
pressure to precommit themselves; incumbents completing in‐
terest group questionnaires in advance of retention elections
56. See Marley, supra note 43; see also Todd Richmond, Wis. Gov: State Supreme Court
Infighting Needs to Stop, KOMONEWS.COM (June 27, 2011), http://www.komonews.com/
news/national/124612629.html.
57. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND
GENERAL
JURISDICTION
COURTS
3,
9–10
(2011)
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Judicial_Selection_Charts_11
96376173077.pdf.
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and candidates answering questions in appointment proceed‐
ings may feel likewise.
More fundamentally, insofar as these problems are exacerbated
by elections, they have not reenergized the anti‐election move‐
ment.58 If the public remains convinced that judicial elections do
more good than harm, then seeking to diminish the harm through
incremental reform becomes the one viable alternative.
A.

Re‐Selection Reform

As compared to initial election, the threat to decisional inde‐
pendence posed by re‐election is more acute. Re‐selection puts
incumbents at risk of losing their tenure for making decisions
they should have the independence to make without fear of
reprisal—a threat inapplicable to first‐time candidates. Tradi‐
tionally, retention elections in merit selection states have di‐
minished re‐selection risk by making re‐selection a low‐
salience event, in which voters retain judges because they have
confidence in the courts generally and no information that
leads them to oppose a given judge specifically.59 The irony,
however, is that retention elections “work” only when they do
not. When an energetic opposition campaign surfaces and a
retention election becomes a high‐salience event, incumbents
are ill‐equipped to defend themselves. In some states, incum‐
bents may campaign only after opposition surfaces,60 which can
occur too late in the election cycle for incumbents to respond
effectively. Moreover, incumbents have no opponent to which
they can compare themselves. The recent experience in Iowa
(and elsewhere) is likely to embolden opposition campaigns in
other jurisdictions, which suggests the possibility that the days
of sleepy, uneventful retention elections are numbered.

58. See Geyh, supra note 23, at 1262 (“More recently, the merit selection move‐
ment has stalled.”).
59. See Melinda Gann Hall, Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court
Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL
STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 165, 177 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007) (“[R]etention
elections are the least likely to result in electoral defeat, while partisan elections
are the most likely. In fact, defeats in retention elections are quite unlikely.”).
60. E.g., COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.3(a) (2010), available at
http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Code_of_Judicial_Conduct.pdf (“A judge
who is a candidate for retention in office should abstain from any campaign activity in
connection with the judge’s own candidacy unless there is active opposition to his or
her retention in office.”).
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If re‐election poses a threat to judicial independence, and con‐
tested elections are necessary to preserve public confidence, then
one alternative is to elect judges for single lengthy terms, with no
possibility of re‐selection.61 States seeking to preserve merit selec‐
tion could limit the candidate pool to those qualified by a com‐
mission. In jurisdictions with no appetite for an overhaul of their
selection systems, lengthening judicial terms to reduce the fre‐
quency of re‐selection could work a meaningful improvement.62
B.

Campaign Finance Reform

The campaign finance problem has attracted a number of
thoughtful proposals, including preventative and remedial
steps. On the preventative side, contribution limits and disclo‐
sure requirements are an obvious place to start, but those re‐
forms do nothing to curb the influence of independent cam‐
paigns (which accounted for the vast majority of spending in
West Virginia and Wisconsin, and all spending in Iowa).63 Public
financing of judicial campaigns is superficially appealing, but is
costly and struggles to counter the impact of independent cam‐
paigns.64 James Sample argues that the unique need for judicial
impartiality justifies spending limits on direct and independent
expenditures in judicial campaigns that would be unconstitu‐
tional if imposed in political branch races.65 His argument relies
on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Caperton, and its characteriza‐
tion of independent expenditures in West Virginia’s McGraw‐

61. See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Accountability Before the Fact, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 451, 451–52 (2008); G. Alan Tarr, Rethinking the Selection of
State Supreme Court Justices, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1445, 1466 (2003).
62. Cf. National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection, Call to Action, 34 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1353, 1355 (2001) (“States with relatively short judicial terms of office
should consider increasing the length of those terms. Term limits, whatever their
merits for representative positions, are not appropriate for judicial office.”).
63. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257; Marley, supra note 44; Richmond, supra note
45.
64. See AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, PUBLIC
FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 28 (2002) (“Even if the election fund were
sufficient to underwrite the grants contemplated by the program, however, can‐
didates would still raise 55% of the dollars needed to find their campaigns from
private contributions; and in cases where one candidate declines to accept public
money, all limits are off.”).
65. See generally James Sample, Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Ju‐
dicial Campaign Spending and Equality, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 727 (2011).

No. 2]

Judicial Selection Reconsidered

641

Benjamin race as “contributions,” which the Court has long held
can be regulated more freely than spending.66
On the remedial side, the American Bar Association has in‐
cluded a rule in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct that re‐
quires judges to disqualify themselves if they receive direct
contributions in excess of a specified dollar amount.67 Inde‐
pendent expenditures are unaddressed, but in the aftermath of
Caperton, rules have been drafted that propose multifactor
analyses to determine when independent expenditures on a
candidate’s behalf might require his subsequent disqualifica‐
tion.68 Disqualification rules, however, are only as good as the
judges who interpret them. Under West Virginia ethics rules,
Justice Benjamin was required to disqualify himself if his “im‐
partiality might reasonably be questioned”—meaning, if the
justice might appear partial to a reasonable observer.69 Justice
Benjamin ignored the obvious appearance problem created by
deciding his benefactor’s case, disregarding the appearance‐
based disqualification standard to which he was subject, in fa‐
vor of applying an actual bias standard. If disqualification re‐
form is to succeed, it must include procedural reform in which
a judge’s impartiality is evaluated by someone in lieu of or ad‐
dition to the judge whose impartiality is at issue.
C.

Precommitment Reform

The precommitment problem can be managed in three ways.
First, judicial conduct organizations can police candidate pre‐
commitments more aggressively.70 With lower courts divided
on whether White guarantees candidates a “right” to precom‐
mit themselves,71 judicial conduct organizations are likely to
66. Id. at 772–73, 778–79.
67. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 21, at R. 2.11(A)(4).
68. See Letter from Harold D. Melton, Justice, Supreme Court of Georgia, to Lester
Tate, Attorney, Akin & Tate P.C. (Jul. 16, 2010), available at http://www.gabar.org/
public/pdf/news/Recusal_AM10.pdf.
69. W. VA. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (1994), available at
http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/JIC/codejc.htm.
70. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 21, at R. 4.1(A)(13)
(“Except as permitted by law . . . a judge or a judicial candidate shall not . . . in
connection with cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the
court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the
impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.”).
71. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Criticism and Speech of Judges in the United States,
in JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 257, 271 (H.P. Lee ed., 2011) (“Some
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remain tentative unless and until the United States Supreme
Court decides the question in the negative. Second, even if
judges have a right to precommit themselves, the legal estab‐
lishment might, through judicial education, perpetuate long‐
standing norms against candidates exercising such a right, on
the grounds that precommitments undermine confidence in the
impartiality and independence of the courts among parties
who appear before precommitted judges.72 Third, precommit‐
ted judges should be subject to disqualification regardless of
whether they have a First Amendment right to precommit
themselves—a point Justice Ketchum seems to have missed.73 A
judge’s First Amendment right to criticize his neighbor’s
wrongdoing does not subsume a corresponding right to adju‐
dicate such wrongdoing.74 Similarly, disqualification prevents
judges from acting on their precommitments, but does not pun‐
ish them for making precommitments any more than it pun‐
ishes them for criticizing the neighbors. In each instance, dis‐
qualification does not retaliate against the speaker, but protects
the integrity of the judiciary and the rights of litigants.
CONCLUSION
Moderation is dreary by design, as evidenced by the perva‐
sive use of the pop culture prefix “extreme” to infuse excite‐
ment into pretty much everything. When it comes to judicial
elections, staking out strident positions at the poles is entertain‐
ing and comparatively easy.75 It is not, however, especially
productive when selection systems are broken but sweeping
reform is infeasible. During such times, tabling overstated, all‐
or‐nothing arguments in favor of incremental reform that can
make bad situations better is the preferable approach.
courts have invalidated rules barring judges from making pledges, promises or
commitments . . . others have upheld them.”) (citations omitted).
72. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in the Courts in an Age
of Individual Rights and Public Skepticism, in BENCH PRESS: THE COLLISION OF
COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA 21, 21–22 (Keith J. Bybee ed., 2007).
73. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 21, at R. 2.11(A)(5) (re‐
quiring disqualification if “[t]he judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has
made a public statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or
opinion, that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result
or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or controversy”).
74. See Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2348–49 (2011).
75. Witness my own contribution. Geyh, supra note 5.

